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The paper examines the main policies of the imperial government, the tzar’s namestnik (lord 
viceroy) and the State Duma concerning the Caucasus question between 1905 and 1907. All the mea-
sures to combat regional nationalism and terrorism are investigated amid the general policy of de-es-
calation of tensions and the remedial actions taken in the wake of revolutionary turmoil. The authors 
investigate the course by the namestnik H. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov who put together all possible reforms 
and security measures to good advantage. The namestnik’s independent policy led to multiple conflicts 
with bureaucrats as well as with the State Duma. A personal factor is also worth taking into account — 
H. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov had awkward dealings with some members of the government, especially 
P. A. Stolypin. The authors conclude that local elites of the region tried to gain maximum concessions 
from the government in the shortest time possible through demonstrating explicit support of revolu-
tionary circles. At the same time, the imperial administration’s overriding demand for the restoration to 
minimally safe conditions was more or less ignored. Having chosen the language of slogans and massive 
pressure on the Tsarist administration, the Caucasian deputies of the State Duma abrogated the possibil-
ity of satisfying their voters’ expectations and fulfilled the roles of background players in settling regional 
conflicts. In conclusion, the viceroyalty was the most effective institution in the revolutionary context 
though it remained a provisional and emergency structure. Only H. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov had enough 
prerogative and subtle understanding of the situation and, finally, it was he as namestnik who took it 
upon himself to introduce real measures to settle national differences in the region and to advocate for 
the rights of the Caucasian communities in the face of the Centre. Refs 54.
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КАВКАЗСКАЯ ПОЛИТИКА ИМПЕРСКИХ ВЛАСТЕЙ  
В ПЕРИОД ПЕРВОЙ РУССКОЙ РЕВОЛЮЦИИ
В статье проанализированы основные направления деятельности центрального правитель-
ства, наместника и зарождающихся представительских учреждений Российской империи в от-
ношении Кавказа в 1905–1907 гг. Меры по борьбе с региональным национализмом и террориз-
мом рассматриваются в контексте общей политики снижения напряженности и преодоления 
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последствий революционных потрясений. Достаточно успешная программа «умиротворения» 
Кавказа с помощью административно-политических реформ была связана с именем И. И. Во-
ронцова-Дашкова. Однако самостоятельная политика наместника привела к  конфликту как 
с  петербургской бюрократией, так и с  Государственной думой, что затруднило проведение 
преобразований, призванных решить вопросы, поставленные первой русской революцией. 
При этом стоит учитывать и личностный фактор — непростые отношения И. И. Воронцова-
Дашкова с  представителями правительства, в  особенности с  П. А. Столыпиным. Авторы ис-
следования показывают, как политические представители грузин, армян и  азербайджанцев 
в Первой и Второй думах пытались в кратчайший срок добиться максимальных уступок со 
стороны власти путем открытой поддержки революционных кругов. Революционная оппози-
ция обладала достаточно развернутыми и радикальными (по меркам инертного руководства 
империи) программами реформ. Запрос имперских структур на приоритетное восстановле-
ние минимально безопасных условий функционирования при этом игнорировался. Выбрав 
язык лозунгов и  массированного давления на царскую бюрократию, народные избранники 
исключили возможность сотрудничества и не смогли помочь своим избирателям. Они добро-
вольно отвели себе роль статистов в урегулировании региональных конфликтов, не в силах 
преодолеть совокупность локальных противоречий. Наиболее эффективными в  условиях 
революции стали действия временной и  чрезвычайной, но  облеченной реальными полно-
мочиями и тонким пониманием ситуации властной структуры — института наместничества. 
Однако в самой его сути были заложены ограничения, исключавшие возможность кардиналь-
ного разрешения проблем, многие из которых до сих пор терзают Кавказ. Несмотря на это, 
И. И. Воронцов-Дашков не только выработал эффективные меры по снижению напряжен-
ности, но и  отстоял сохранение кавказского представительства в  российском парламенте. 
Библиогр. 54 назв.
Ключевые слова: революция в  России 1905–1907  гг., Кавказское наместничество, Совет 
министров, Государственная дума, национализм, имперское управление.
During the first Russian revolution the system of governance of the Caucasus under-
went fundamental changes. The paper examines major administrative and political activ-
ities of the central government and emerging representative offices of the Russian Empire 
in this region, in particular, the measures taken to confront local national movements in 
the context of a policy aimed at alleviating tension and overcoming the effects of revo-
lutionary turmoil. In order to assess the effectiveness of new mechanisms of governance 
the authors analyze their application to the resolution of the first series of events in the 
Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict. 
The study of the relationships between the authorities and society, the State Duma 
and administrative civil servants in terms of governance of the Caucasus is still of interest 
to scholars and the public. This is prompted by both the existence of ongoing armed con-
flicts and the “unfinished state” (a condition which seems to be everlasting), the heteroge-
neity and doubtful effectiveness of the contemporary models of governing the territories 
comprising the Caucasus Viceroyalty a century ago.
Not elaborating on the extensive historiography of the issue, some recent publications 
concerning the events of 1905–1907 in the Caucasus are worthy of note. First and fore-
most, one has to point out works in Russian: the papers by A. T. Urushadze, M. F. Florin-
sky, a monograph by E. A. Pravilova; general studies by D. I. Ismail-Zade; works by an Aus-
trian researcher A. Kappeler; a thesis by A. S. Kondrasheva [Urushadze 2015а; Urushadze 
2015b; Florinsky 2009; Pravilova 2006; Ismail-Zade 2005; Ismail-Zade 2008; Kappeler 
2005; Kondrasheva 2003]. As far as historiography from Caucasus and Transcaucasia is 
concerned, it mainly deals with the “emerging revival” of the particular peoples of the re-
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gion, which, as we see it, determines a dogmatic approach to the analysis of the activities 
of the representatives of central state offices and local communities in terms of “colonial” 
and “national-liberation” discourses [Ejubov 2010; Perinchek 2011; Gasanly 2013; Dz-
habbarov 2016]. To a large extent, similar approaches are typical of research by “outside” 
scholars, though it should be noted that they tend to be less biased in studying imperial 
structures and practices [Hovannisian 1971; Sargent 2010]. On the whole, there have been 
few attempts to examine particular transformations in the imperial political system and 
instability in the Caucasus from 1905 to 1906, apart from research by M. A. Volhonskij, 
V. P. Pljaskin, N. T. Rahmanin [Volhonskij 2003; Pljaskin 2003; Volhonskij 2005; Pljaskin, 
Rahmanin 2013] and some general comments in different publications [Volhonskij, etc. 
2013]. Anyway, some aspects of the issue still have remained unclear. For example, the 
Caucasus policy of Duma has been predominantly considered as applied to the third call-
ing or to some particular deputies [Darchieva 2013]. Moreover, in our opinion, scholars 
have drawn insufficient emphasis to the role of the Russian parliament and its conflict 
with the imperial government in exacerbating the region’s turmoil Thus we shall try to 
look at the known issue from a different perspective.
The sources used for the following research have been the holdings of the central state 
offices of the Russian Empire and executive offices of the namestnik (lord viceroy) of the 
Caucasus kept in the Russian State Historical Archive.
After the abolition of The Caucasus Viceroyalty in 1882, the administration of the 
executive office in the region was incorporated into the Ministerial system of the Empire. 
Its ineffectiveness was more or less compensated by the growth of the staff. Over the peri-
od 1882–1905 the number of civil servants in the region doubled [Gorodnizky 2004, p. 4]. 
The practice of governing from Saint Petersburg through the glavnonachal’stvujushhij (di-
rector), by and large, proved unsuccessful. The approach whereby “all matters related to 
the Caucasus are to be dealt with, as in inner governorates, through ministries” [Kondra-
sheva 2003, p. 206] was not there fully adopted. The glavnonachal’stvujushhij generally 
acted as a mediator between the local administration and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
In revolutionary 1905 there was no other choice but to restore the Viceroyalty. The 
namestnik (viceroy) was granted emergency authorities. In due form his coordination 
with ministries was still preserved. However, the status of a new position was equal to 
that of the minister and presupposed a membership in the State Council. Moreover, a 
namestnik was given remit to resolve issues that had once been in the domain of the su-
preme power. For example, civil and military officials of the Caucasus were subordinated 
to him and could be appointed or dismissed by him. Under the decree of 3 March 1905, 
the namestnik became Commander-in-chief of the Military district of the Caucasus and 
the appointed hetman (ataman) of the Terek and Kuban Cossacks [Mezhdu centralizmom 
i regionalizmom…, pp. 182–184; Darchieva 2016].
This significant and responsible post was offered to an outstanding administrator 
Count Hillarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov, who enjoyed the immense trust of the 
emperor. Over the decade (1905–1915) it was he who had been largely determining im-
perial policy in the Caucasus. In his report to the Emperor from 12 April 1905, H. I. Vo-
rontsov-Dashkov outlined legislative framework of his duties (article 9–19, as well as 26, 
27 of the Constitution of the branches in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia of 1876). He 
stressed that “all references necessary for the matters of the Caucasus and Transcauca-
sia, information, explanations etc. related to the aspects of governance are to be obtained 
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through no other means but the viceroy of the Caucasus” [O porjadke podchinennosti 
lichnogo sostava Kavkazskih sudebnyh ustanovlenij, l. 6 ob.].
In the environment of 1905, courts and law enforcement authorities turned out to 
pose the greatest challenge administration. They demonstrated impotence in struggling 
with threats to the regional security. This fact was pointed out by H. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov 
in his letter to Minister of Justice S. S. Manukhin from 3, September, 1905 (№ 200): “I have 
no right to conceal from Your High Excellency my overall unfavorable impression of the 
activities of judiciaries dealing with crimes against the state, an impression formed from 
applying the particular cases addressed to me personally. Most probably, the judicial bu-
reaucrats are far from setting themselves the serious goal of assisting investigators as far as 
crimes against the state are concerned, but they are trying to find faults and errors in in-
vestigation which is always possible even in a less sensitive area [O snoshenijah s raznymi 
mestami i licami, ll. 1 ob.-2].
In the context of the revolutionary crisis it is possible to identify four different sets of 
measures taken by the viceroy to “pacify” the Caucasus. Foremost, the reforms were made 
aimed at raising the status of civil servants. Secondly, actions were taken to implement 
electoral legislation concerning the State Duma to the reality of the Caucasus reality and 
relationships were established between the central and local administration and the co-
operative elements of the population. Third, the government enhanced security to resist 
revolutionary and national movements and to de-escalate the conflict between Armenians 
and Muslims of Transcaucasia. Finally, religious policy towards Christian Armenians and 
Georgians as well as Muslims of the Caucasus was corrected.
As early as in April, 1905, in his report to Nicolas II, Vorontsov-Dashkov suggested 
making the namestnik’s status and rights equal to those of the ministers and chief exec-
utive officers over the civil servants in the Caucasus. What was meant was the right to 
dismiss, to appoint, to promote, to reward and to grant pensions. By the decrees from 
26 February 1906 and 3 May 1906 the viceroy was vested with the authority of the minis-
ter over all civil servants in the Caucasus excluding those of the State Control, State Bank 
and law structures [O porjadke podchinennosti lichnogo sostava Kavkazskih sudebnyh 
ustanovlenij, ll. 1–2 ob.]. However, the role of the Ministry of Finance remained signifi-
cant. It retained its key functions concerning “managing the economy and finances of the 
region, which were incorporated, at least de jure, into the financial system of the Empire” 
[Quote from: Ismailova 2016, p. 12]. According to A. M. Ismailova, “the government and 
the Ministry of Finance preeminently tried to prevent “privatization” of the resources of 
the provinces and to restore the hierarchy of connections by frequent inspections and by 
means of centralized resource management. Debates and “negotiations” concerning eco-
nomic authorities often resulted in conflicts between regional administration and central 
financial institution” [Ismailova 2016, p. 12].
As far as judicial sphere is concerned, H. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov insisted on judiciaries 
remaining subordinated to the center. First of all, “transfer of authority of the Minister 
of Justice to do with appointments, promotions and other changes and benefits of the 
officials of this Ministry to the governor-general, i.e. supreme administrative power in 
the region, might arouse the suspicion of the lack of independence of local courts from 
the administration and undermine the local population’s trust in the judiciary”. Secondly, 
Vorontsov-Dashkov wrote to the executive officer of the Committee of ministers E. Y. Nol-
de that “the viceroy will never have the same wide range of candidates as the Minister of 
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Justice” [O porjadke podchinennosti lichnogo sostava Kavkazskih sudebnyh ustanovlenij, 
l. 3]. The latter was the authorized representative of the governor-general in Saint Pe-
tersburg and defended his interests in the state offices [Mezhdu centralizmom i region-
alizmom…, pp. 185–86]. According to E. Y. Nolde, the viceroy’s suggestions met all the 
demands of the current imperial policy.
A special procedure of appointing civil servants in the Caucasus contradicted at-
tempts at judicial unification in the Empire. Nolde as well as Vorontsov-Dashkov as expe-
rienced Saint Petersburg officials realized it wholeheartedly. Therefore, an imperial decree 
from 13, July, 1905 preserving this procedure and being enforced with regards to judicia-
ries until the restoration of the viceroyalty, was approved by them.
Under the circumstances described above the influence of the Minister of Justice on 
the Caucasus policy considerably increased. Between 1906 and 1915 the Ministry of Jus-
tice in Russia was headed by I. G. Shcheglovitov. Having visited the region in 1910 he de-
manded that all representatives of local nationalities be discharged from employment in 
courts due to the “Russianization” policy. Some of the principal executives of the Ministry 
in the Caucasus lost their posts due to the failure to comply with his order.
It should be noted that Saint Petersburg was highly concerned with the religious iden-
tity of their “indigenous” colleagues. Inspecting subordinate institutions, I. G. Shcheglovi-
tov constantly reminded that “moral principles of non-Christian beliefs are fundamentally 
contrary to Christian ethics” [Shavlokhova 2014, p. 88]. This approach contradicted the 
intentions of the Caucasus administration. But in 1905 Vorontsov-Dashkov had to comply 
with the officials from the capital. At the same time, some responsibility for cruel suppres-
sion of the revolution was shifted from him in the eyes of local population.
The tendency to centralize and “russify” civil servants overshadowed the necessity to 
rationalize the cooperation between judicial authority and police in the Caucasus. This 
situation was not legally settled until the collapse of the Empire. Moreover, later on (by 
1908) Petersburg officials enjoyed the support of nationalist deputies of the Duma in their 
efforts to extend the influence of the Council of Ministries in the matters in the Caucasus 
[Shavlokhova 2014, p. 88; Ismail–Zade 2008].
We can only partly agree with the conclusions that “renewed Russian administration 
was in need of an effective means of combating the abrek movement spreading in the 
region” [Urushadze 2015, p. 145]. This movement was generally of a local character, and 
started to be perceived as an important threat only after the first Russian revolution in the 
context of Pan-Islamism. According to the archive documents, it is possible to assert that 
both the viceroy and the Ministry of Internal affairs were far more concerned about the 
events in Transcaucasia, in major Russian centers in the North Caucasus and about the 
forthcoming election to the State Duma. 
As far as the police was concerned, it also had to be supported. “The most loyal 
and devoted report” by the namestnik to Tsar Nicolas II from 22, April, 1905 character-
ized the state of affairs as extremely alarming. H. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov pointed out that 
“anti-government political propaganda” “over recent years had significantly increased 
and brought about a number of revolutionary and social-democratic movements in the 
province”. He wrote about the inadequacy of resources to curb the revolution. “For the 
whole vast territory of the Caucasus… with its almost 9-million population there have 
been established only six provincial gendarme departments comprising 32 officers and 
139 sub-officers, two fortress gendarme troops (2 officers and 22 sub-officers), one in-
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sufficiently equipped “guard department” (secret police) unit in Tiflis, two small inves-
tigation offices in Baku and Batumi and two gendarme police railway departments for 
the Transcaucasian and Vladikavkaz railway” [Ob ob’edinenii policejskoj dejatel’nosti na 
Kavkaze, l. 6].
To amass governmental forces the suggestion was issued to create two special offices: 
one to deal with paperwork, the other to supply domestic intelligence in the region. The 
agent net was supposed to be financed by no less than 100,000 rub. a year [Ob ob’edinenii 
policejskoj dejatel’nosti na Kavkaze, l. 6]. The report also indicated that financial support 
of such measures in the Caucasus was low in comparison with similar ones in the Warsaw 
governorate-general (320 667 Rub. against 433 794 Rub.) [Ob ob’edinenii policejskoj deja-
tel’nosti na Kavkaze, l. 7]. Revolutionary events in Baku demonstrated the low economic 
and social status of police officers, the shortage of modern weapons and well-trained staff.
The report was approved on 22 April 1905. Local senior police officers were vest-
ed with the authority of division commanders and with the right to apply to the gover-
nor-general for rewarding or promoting their subordinates even if “these subordinates 
didn’t meet the requirements of the existing rules concerning rewards” [Ob ob’edinenii 
policejskoj dejatel’nosti na Kavkaze, l. 9].
Upon the intercession of Vorontsov-Dashkov, lieutenant-general E. Y. Shirinkin was 
appointed by the imperial decree of 22 May 1905 to head the police in the Caucasus. The 
proposal to increase funding for the secret service by 100,000 Rubles was also approved. 
[Ob ob’edinenii policejskoj dejatel’nosti na Kavkaze, ll. 30–32]. A widespread statement 
that police officers were not well-paid is true to a certain degree. For example, the gover-
nor-general insisted that junior police officers (police inspectors in the Commissioner’s 
office) should be made equivalent to state civil servants and given rights similar to police 
officers of Moscow and Saint Petersburg (XIV grade of service class, IX grade of pension) 
[Pis’mo namestnika Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva na Kavkaze…, l. 40 ob.].
As the revolutionary situation in the Caucasus developed, it became clear that all 
law-enforcement services had to be united under the command of the viceroy. In April, 
1906 the suggestion was issued to revoke the post of the Police Commissioner in the Cau-
casus. 
When the Duma convened, it was no longer possible to take immediate decisions. 
Nicolas II ordered everything should be done in accordance with the legislative procedure. 
The correspondence between the namestnik and the Council of Ministries and Stolypin 
concerning this matter lasted several months. Obviously, the government objected to the 
participation of the Duma deputies in considering this matter. The project “Provision-
al regulations concerning a Special police department at the Office of the namestnik of 
His Imperial Majesty in the Caucasus” itself didn’t undergo much editing. The necessity 
of preserving the pre-Duma legal framework in ruling Caucasus was supported by an 
experienced police general E. N. Shirinkin, who was personally in charge of the security 
of Nicolas II. In this matter he was generally in line with the suggestions made by Vo-
rontsov-Dashkov in 1905. However, it remained unclear how to avoid the debate about the 
revolutionary movement in the Caucasus in the Duma.
The Council of Ministers successfully found a solution to the situation. Vo-
rontsov-Dashkov implied in his proposals that it might be possible to downsize the re-
cord-keeping office. It was an appropriate reason. A document (a special journal of the 
Council of Ministers) dated 1 August 1906 “On merging civil and police administration 
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in the Caucasus” was approved by Nicolas II on 24 August 1906. The reform of the po-
lice force didn’t require any new expenditure. On the contrary, the economy amounted 
to 27,400 Rub. per year. The changes came down to “abolition of the post of the Police 
Commissioner in the Caucasus, vesting the governor-general with this authority, aboli-
tion of some posts in the former office of the Police Commissioner and incorporating the 
remaining positions into the office of the governor-general under the name of the spe-
cial police department” [Ob ob’edinenii policejskoj dejatel’nosti na Kavkaze, l. 63]. It was 
concerned with the prerogatives of the Crown — staff reshuffles in the structures of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. Thus, circumventing the State Duma the government man-
aged to support Vorontsov-Dashkov’s policy and to concentrate the power in his hands to 
overwhelm the revolutionary movement in the Caucasus.
It should be noted that the special legal status of politically volatile Caucasus areas had 
been created before the arrival of Vorontsov-Dashkov. The “Increased security” regime 
was introduced in Tiflis and Baku with adjoining areas (approved on 29, June, 1901), Ba-
tumi (approved on 22, June, 1902), Elisabethpol, Kars, Nukha, Shusha, and Alexandropol 
(approved on 27, October, 1903), in counties of Akhaltsikhe, Akhalkalaki and Borchali in 
Tiflis governorate (guberniya) (approved on 26, February, 1904), in Kutaisi and counties 
of Kutaisi, Ozergeti and Novosenaki in Kutaisi governorate (approved on 13, February, 
1905) and Erivan (approved on 18, March, 1905) [Ob ob’edinenii policejskoj dejatel’nosti 
na Kavkaze, l. 19].
One of the most serious struggles within The Caucasus Viceroyalty during the period 
of the first Russian revolution was the Armenian–Tatar (Armenian-Azerbaijani) conflict, 
whose acute phase started with the clashes in Baku on 6–9, February, 1905. Let us briefly 
outline them. The telegram sent to Saint Petersburg by governor-general wasn’t classified 
as secret, it just notified of the fact of “pogrom”. About 60 % of businesses was destroyed, 
“mostly Armenian” companies suffered, only large foreign and Russian companies sur-
vived. The material losses, according to Vorontsov-Dashkov, amounted to 25 million ru-
bles. “Chernyj gorod” (Black city), except for the Armenian Caspian company, had sur-
vived, “about 4 million tons of oil had been burnt”. “The impetus for the pogrom came 
from the revolutionaries; the Tatars from the neighboring villages as well as evil workers of 
all possible nationalities, including Russians, took advantage of the disturbance”. Shooting 
among the inhabitants stopped, but “murdering with bladed weapons” continued. There 
was an attempt on the part of the governor-general at reconciliation with the help of the 
clergy and elected representatives from the conflicting sides, but mostly he pointed out the 
possibility of resorting to military units and taking steps to reorganize the police. “Seven 
newly-arrived battalions of the second brigade of 33th division were inspected, we expect 
the last battalion and artillery today; it has been ordered to strengthen the police force 
in the city and industries in accordance with the promise of the Minister of Finance to 
reimburse expenses; Armenian and Tatar police officers are being replaced with the Rus-
sian reserve officers of junior ranks; it has been ordered that the town governor’s office 
be established as well as to remove the Tatar villages that have always been of a criminal 
nature from industrial areas”. [Telegramma I. I. Voroncova-Dashkova — stats-sekretarju 
Je.Ju. Nol’de, ll. 1–1 ob., 2 (Polulist 1–2–3)].
Later on the oil-industry area in Baku and labor movement were also under the 
scrutiny of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Even at the beginning of 1907, 
the authorities feared another wave of unrest among workers and tried to eliminate any 
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possible causes for strike. They mostly were anxious about the possibility of ship work-
ers in Baku going on strike. It might disrupt petroleum products delivery. P. A. Stolypin 
wrote to the governor-general that “such events threaten the whole of Russian industry 
with numberless calamities”. The Prime Minister asked to “provide local administration, 
which is responsible for maintaining order, with any assistance so that they won’t be taken 
by surprise and have sufficient military force on stand-by for immediate suppression of 
riots” [Perepiska s Sovetom ministrov ob armjano-tatarskih stolknovenijah…, l. 48]. The 
pogroms of 1905, still remembered in Baku, occurred due to the inability of the authori-
ties to use the troops expediently.
In May 1905 riots spread to the Yerivan governorate, and in summer they swept across 
whole districts of Baku and Elizabethpol governorates, as well as Tiflis. The acute stage of 
confrontation took place in 1905–1906. It is impossible to describe the above-mentioned 
events in detail within this article, so we refer the reader to specific studies [Sargent 2010].
It is worth mentioning that the first State Duma was unable to be actively involved 
in tackling the problem due to the brevity of its convocation. Another obstacle to their 
involvement in resolving the conflict was the special status of the governor-general pro-
tected by the decree “on the restoration of the post of the governor-general of the Cau-
casus” from 26 February 1905. A civil servant holding this position was subordinate to 
the Emperor [Zakonodatel’nye akty perehodnogo vremeni…, p. 32]. I. L. Goremykin, who 
became the Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1906, systematically redirected in-
quiries from the Duma concerning the pogrom to the governor-general in the Caucasus. 
As the Chairman saw it, he was lacking the necessary data and had no authority to deal 
with the relatively undue activities of the administration in Transcaucasia which might 
spark the development of Armenian-Tatar conflict in the region (from 13–15 June, 1906, 
№ 337). These matters were within the competence of the governor-general. Goremykin 
wrote that “according to the existing legislation the position and power of the governor- 
general are not under ministerial control” [Perepiska s Sovetom ministrov ob armjano-ta-
tarskih stolknovenijah…, l. 29 ob.]. However, Vorontsov-Dashkov himself was willing to 
cooperate constructively with the public of Transcaucasia, and later with the first Russian 
Parliament [Vorontsov-Dashkov 1907, p. 4].
The First State Duma’s interest in the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict was determined 
at least by the fact that representatives of both sides were among its members. Elizabeth-
pol (modern-day Ganja) governorate was represented by two Armenian and two Muslim 
deputies; Yerivan governorate by two Armenian deputies and one Muslim, Baku gover-
norate by two Muslim deputies, the city of Baku by one Muslim. [Vybornye proizvodstva 
… 3 otdel. Po Bakinskoj gubernii, ll. 1–3; Vybornye proizvodstva… 9 otdel. Po Elisavet-
pol’skoj gubernii, ll. 2–3; Vybornye proizvodstva…9 otdel. Po Kutaisskoj gubernii, ll. 2–3]. 
Moreover, a number of representatives (not only of Armenian or Azerbaijani origin) had 
already had experience in taking part in the actions organized by the authorities to alle-
viate the conflict. 
Before anyone else, it was most probably the editor-in-chief of the influential news-
paper “Caspij” and member of the Committee on reconciliation between Armenians and 
Muslims, the “Azerbajani” A. M. Topchubashov, who initiated intense political activity. 
Even in March, 1905 he headed a group of intellectuals in Baku who adopted “The dec-
laration of Muslims’ needs” which was supposed to be handed over to the author of the 
project of the Imperial Duma A. G. Bulygin. In April 1905, being in the delegation from 
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the Duma of Baku, A. M. Topchubashov arrived in Saint Petersburg where he had an au-
dience with Bulygin and with Vorontsov-Dashkov and voiced the proposals stated in the 
“Declaration” [Sejidzade 1991, pp. 8–11]. Probably, the governor-general’s permission to 
issue a newspaper “The Hayat” in the Azerbajani language was a gesture of recognition. 
At the same time, A. M. Topchubashov took part in creating a prototype of the Muslim 
fraction on the Duma, the “Ittifaq al-Muslimin” [Gasanly 2013, pp. 141–142; Usmanova 
2005, p. 134].
The next meeting of the actual leader of Transcaucasian Muslims took place in the 
second decade of June. A. M. Topchubashov defended Muslims against the background of 
a new stage of confrontation (so called Yerivan events) but also “counterattacked”, accusing 
the press of condemning the Azeri and covering up the actions of Armenian insurgents. 
It is of interest that despite the seriousness of the conflict, the Muslim representative in 
his speech mainly focused on the requests for organizing national educational institutions 
(which were generally well-received by H. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov) [Gasanly 2013, p. 143].
During the spring-summer of 1905 a Senate inspection to investigate the causes of 
February massacre and its culprits was carried out in Baku. According to the report by a 
senator A. M. Kuzminsky [Kuzminsky 1906], both sides of the conflict were consolidated 
and willing to cooperate to shift the responsibility for fueling the conflict to local authori-
ties, which, in fact, played the role of extras. The Muslim side presented the same materi-
als, which had been given to the viceroy the week previous [Gasanly 2013, p. 143]. On the 
whole, as it is stated in “The report on the governance of the Caucasus”. Vorontsov-Dash-
kov gradually took the Azerbajani side. He considered the activity of the Armenian terror-
ist organization “Dashnaktsutyun” to be a key factor in the escalation of the conflict [Vo-
rontsov-Dashkov 1907, pp. 8–17]. In autumn 1905 the situation in Baku was aggravated. 
The confrontation spread across the whole of Absheron and took an economic form: up to 
half of the oil derricks were destroyed, the output of oil declined by one third in compar-
ison with the previous year [Rustamova 2013, p. 173, 175]. Given the circumstances, the 
opposing forces chose different strategies for dialogue with the authorities. The Azerbai-
jani continued their cooperation with the viceroy and won over the Russian population of 
Baku as well as the Russian press. Oil magnates on behalf of the Armenian side appealed 
to the Council of Ministers for total eviction of “the Tatars” from the settlements located in 
proximity to the oil production enterprises [Gasanly 2013, pp. 144–145]. The resolution 
in favor of any party was suspended by the Manifesto of 17 October and the escalation of 
the revolution.
After the manifesto of 6 August 1905 (the Bulyginskaya Duma) and 17 October 1905, 
petitions were addressed to the viceroy from Ekaterinodar and Novorossiysk, while in 
Saint Petersburg there was a special council concerning the application of the Duma elec-
toral legislation to the Caucasus. D. M. Solsky became the Chairman of the council, which 
was comprised of civil servants being representatives of Caucasian nobility: the jäger-
meister Prince D. Melikov, chamberlain Prince N. Argytinsky-Dolgorukov, the chairman 
of the Caucasian archeological commission E. Veidenbaum. Other members included: a 
civil servant for special missions of the governor-general Aselder-bek Kazanalipov, the 
major of Poti N. Nikoladze, a member of the City council of Batumi G. Zhuryli. Prince 
I. Chavchavadze, former chairman of Board of Nobles’s Land Bank of Tiflis and publisher 
of the newspaper “Iveria”, was included by special request of the governor-general [Sovet 
ministrov po namestnichestvu na Kavkaze…, ll. 108, 115–115 ob.].
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Rumors about preparing a new “Electoral regulation” circulated and prompted some 
discussions among executives of Transcaucasia. On 21, January, 1906 acting governor of 
Tiflis Prince Cherkezov sent a telegram to E. Y. Nolde about the necessity of drawing up 
electoral registers. In response to his telegram Nolde replied that the detailed information 
from Saint Petersburg would be delivered to Tiflis personally by a member of a special 
council E. Veidenbaum [Sovet ministrov po namestnichestvu na Kavkaze, l. 118].
What was the proposed election procedure like during the preparation for the cam-
paign in the Caucasus in 1906? It was subject to terms set out in the document entitled 
“On the application of the Duma electoral legislation to the Caucasus”, whose projects 
were considered both in the office of the viceroy and Saint Petersburg. These documents 
bear signs of numerous hand-written comments and editing. There were some signifi-
cant departures from “general principles” as far as the election procedure was concerned. 
Two electoral assemblies were formed in Terek and Kuban constituencies. The first one 
consisted of electors representing Cossacks while the second one of electors represent-
ing the rest of the population. Elections in the North Caucasus in the constituencies of 
Avar, Andi, Gunib, Dargin, Kazikumukh and Samur costituencies were supposed to be 
held as conventions of authorized representatives of village communities. The Black Sea 
Governorate, Batumi and Suhimi districts made up one constituency with its centre in 
Batumi. [Sovet ministrov po namestnichestvu na Kavkaze…, ll. 123–123 ob.]. This might 
have been done with a view to increasing Russian representation during the election. The 
military governor of the Batumi district was put in charge of supervision of the electoral 
campaign. The namestnik had the right to appoint local persons to head electoral commis-
sions if there were no district marshals of nobility or arbitrators. However, police officers 
and those who were involved in drawing electoral registers could not be appointed. [Sovet 
ministrov po namestnichestvu na Kavkaze…, l. 126]. 
While designing the statute on election by law of 6, August, 1905  the authorities 
hoped to rely upon large landholders. At the same time, they were apprehensive of the 
Georgian nobility’s nationalism. According to the Ministry of Internal affairs, “landlords 
in the Caucasus were in a more favorable position in comparison with land owners even 
in southern governorates”. It was necessary not to base representation upon the value of 
the estate and the harvest rate, but upon the increased number of desyatina (instead of 
135, as proposed by the governor-general, the minister’s project stated 200). Terek and 
Kuban districts were in a special situation as there were a large number of Cossacks’ lands 
exempt from district taxes, and their landlords were of Russian origin. In their case the 
state land-tax was applied, which was also relatively high at 50 Rubles. To compare: in the 
governor-general’s proposals this norm was 70 Rubles of district levy [Sovet ministrov po 
namestnichestvu na Kavkaze…, ll. 4–4 ob.].
Final projects supposed significant reduction in the qualification: up to 15 Rubles of 
district tax for governorates and districts of Transcaucasia and to 3 Rubles 30 copecks of 
state land-tax for Terek and Kuban districts. It was the third attempt at introducing ade-
quate norms of qualification. A little earlier the governor-general had suggested “30 Ru-
bles of district tax for governorates and districts of Transcaucasia and 6 Rubles 60 copecks 
of state land-tax for Terek and Kuban districts”. A reduced qualification had to ensure the 
turnout of voters. In the context of the revolution an election failure was disadvantageous 
for the authorities. One of the variants of the document read, with reference to repre-
sentatives of the Special Council: “Georgian nobility rarely and reluctantly makes use of 
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the right of collective voting at the assemblies of nobility (and sends representatives)”. It 
was proposed to allow all landlords to participate in preliminary conventions since “those 
whose district tax is a little less than 30 Rubles are bound to consider themselves deprived 
at the election”. [Sovet ministrov po namestnichestvu na Kavkaze…, ll. 127–128]. Geor-
gian nobles appealed to decrease the qualification. This measure was provided for in the 
Project concerning introducing district institutions in Transcaucasia; however, for a large 
number of landowners such replacement of direct participation in the election was un-
likely to satisfy their political ambitions [Sovet ministrov po namestnichestvu na Kavka-
ze…, l. 132]. The authorities were forced to seek support of regional nobility; nevertheless, 
it was not a mistake. 
The document specified the electoral procedure for Elithabethpol and Yerivan gov-
ernorates. The former one was inhabited by 872,000 people: 292,000 of Armenian origin, 
534,000 “Tatars”; the population of the latter one was 819,000 people: 441,000 of Armenian 
origin, 313,000 “Tatars”. The viceroy was recommended to “combine villages in electoral 
districts as he thinks fit in accordance with ethnic composition of the population, even if 
in alternate strips”, and to divide each electoral convention into two parts “determined in 
advance (here it is crossed out and the conjunction “and” is inserted (author’s note)) the 
number of members of the State Duma to be elected from each part” [Sovet ministrov po 
namestnichestvu na Kavkaze…, l. 128]. 
The authorities in the Caucasus had to resort to democracy and involve inorodtsy 
(non-Russians) in the election given the revolution and national unrest. At the same time 
new conflicts caused by Armenian-Azerbaijani hostility were anticipated “especially in 
those governorates where neither prevails”. Nonetheless, the administration in the Cauca-
sus advised holding elections in such regions. They justly believed that “participation in 
all-Russian representative institutions might have a positive impact on their outlook and 
relieve mutual enmity among the indigenous population of Transcaucasia”. “As a precau-
tion, it wouldn’t be inappropriate to separate Muslims from Armenians during the elec-
tions as… Cossacks and the indigenous (non-military) population in Kuban and Terek 
districts are separated”. According to authorities, “conventions of city dwellers as well as 
district land owners due to their civility and cultivation and small numbers are unlikely 
to provoke any clashes between nationalities” [Sovet ministrov po namestnichestvu na 
Kavkaze…, ll. 128–129].
One of the brightest initiatives by the regional authorities to ease tension between 
Armenians and Azerbaijani was organizing the “conciliatory” convention in Tiflis pro-
posed by the governor-general (20 February — 6 March 1906). Its composition was more 
than representative: there were all members of the governor-general’s Council, governors, 
representatives from Armenian and Azerbaijanian sides, clergy, all leading newspapers 
of Transcaucasia [Sejidzade 1991, pp. 17–22; Ismail–Zade 2008, pp. 76–77]. It should be 
noted, though, that representativeness of the convention and the loyalty of most deputes 
to the authorities resulted in the final declaration containing only a range of liberal politi-
cal demands: introduction of free general primary education in native languages, trials by 
jury, equality under the law etc.
Among “practical” measures there was a suggestion for creating a special namestnik’s 
council of voters from the population. It was approved by Vorontsov-Dashkov [Sejidzade 
1991, pp. 21–22]. However, upon the end of the convention its participants were involved 
in a new political battle for the right to be elected to the All-Russian Duma, a typical de-
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mand of the revolutionary period. In the first Duma representatives of conflicting sides, 
not surprisingly, found themselves within the same fraction of Kadets. At the same time 
Muslims from Transcaucasia coordinated their actions with other Muslim deputes within 
the above-mentioned “Ittifaq al-Muslimin” [Topchubashev 1907, pp. 25–26].
The Armenian-Azerbaijanian issue was debated in the State Duma (by the Commis-
sion of “thirty three”) on 6 June and 12 June 1905 [Gosudarstvennaja Duma: Stenogra-
ficheskie otchety. Sessija Pervaja. T. II, pp. 1227–1241; Po povodu stolknovenija tatar s 
armjanami v Jerivanskoj i Elisavetpol’skoj gubernijah…]. Representatives of the region 
of Armenian origin (H. I. Bagaturov, K. M. Ter-Petrosyants) and of Muslim origin (I. Zi-
yatchanov) as well as a speaker from the Kadets’ commission K. K. Chernosvitov outlined 
the causes and the development of the Armenian-Muslim conflict. All orators voiced a 
consolidated opinion (that of the Kadets) accusing the regional authorities of incompe-
tence, inaction and provocations of the massacre. In fact, they presented two quite vague 
demands: to take steps to resolve the conflict and to make “persons and authorities” ac-
countable for it [Gosudarstvennaja Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety. Sessija Pervaja. T. II, 
p. 1228]. Additionally, they criticized the concepts of Russificaton and colonization of the 
Caucasus.
According to the shorthand records, the most radical orator of 12, June, 1906 became 
a representative from Kutaisi governorate, the Georgian social-democrat I. I. Ramishvili. 
He had already acted as a mediator between the conflicting sides. His speech, replete with 
Marxist rhetoric, contained, however, an essential statement that the population “still, 
probably, … suffers from well-known nationalism”. Unfortunately, I. I. Ramishvili con-
cluded his speech not with suggestions for de-escalating the conflict but with appeals to 
bring down “the abhorrent regime” [Gosudarstvennaja Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety. 
Sessija Pervaja. T. II, pp. 1237–1239].
Within the Second Duma (20  February 1907–2  June 1907) the Caucasus deputies 
kept on promoting protest actions. The well-known “Zurabov incident” (16–17  April) 
has been comprehensively examined in memoirs and special studies [Gosudarstvennaja 
Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety. Sessija Vtoraja. T. I, Stb. 57–68; Zurabov 1908, pp. 48–
50; Golovin 1926, pp. 140–144 etc.]. This particular event has been mostly considered as 
an occasion for the dissolution of the Second Duma though even the imperial officers 
regarded this as secondary [Shvanebah 2008, p. 104–105]. For the issue it is critical to 
underscore that the controversial speech of Russian army was delivered by the Tiflis rep-
resentative A. G. Zurabov who for two years had been in military service [Bojovich 1907, 
p. 472]. His address was no improvisation. Though not touching on the Caucasus itself, 
it reflected hatred to the imperial military system on the part of the social-democrats of 
Transcaucasia. And it must be taken into account that Zurabov was the military case man-
ager in the Social-Democratic faction. The latter considered the ‘old’ armed forces as the 
main instrument of the suppression of the revolution.
As we see it, the results of the activities of civil society of Transcaucasia and its repre-
sentatives in the First and the Second State Duma in solving real problems (for example 
the Armenian-Azerbaijanian confrontation) could only be regarded as negative. In the 
context of a sharp rise of nationalism, reinforced by archaic local and kin aspects, repre-
sentatives of the opposing sides were unable to extend possibilities of cooperation with 
local, regional and imperial administrations. At the level of local authorities it manifested 
itself in their mutual accusations and a massive campaign for preempting investigation 
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(first and foremost, by creating “information noise”). At the same time, in the dialogue 
with the viceroy of the Caucasus and in their speeches in the Parliament, Armenians and 
Azerbaijani chose to be in line with All-Russian liberal mood. They focused on accusing 
civil servants of incompetence and corruption, and demands for autonomous educational 
space of the country and establishing “responsible” municipal and central institutions. 
Thus, the dialogue with the executive structures of the Empire concerning the issue of 
ensuring security, which in the short-run embodied the essence of the conflict, was made 
impossible.
In spite of the problems described above, Vorontsov-Dashkov always supported secur-
ing the representativity of the Caucasus in the State Duma [Djakin 1998, p. 488]. What was 
more important, he expressed his view to Nicolas II personally during the course of creating 
a new election law in 1907. Perhaps the opinion of the namestnik (who was obviously high-
ly regarded by the emperor) defined the tsar’s position highlighted by the head creator of 
the project of the reform S. E. Kryzhanovsky: “The Sovereign expressed the will which was 
confirmed by him in 1907 not to deprive of the right of the vote to those strata of the popu-
lation which had already been given this right” [Kokovtsov, Vladimir Nikolaevich to Sergei 
Efimovich Kryzhanovskii 1929, l. 1]. This meant that both the monarch and Vorontsov-Das-
hkov were not those who intended to change their solutions on the spur of the moment.
On top of all of this, some scholars believe that the namestnik disputed dividing into 
the national electoral curiae as well. So he had to give a special ‘elucidation’ to the law 
informing that the ‘Russian’ curia covers every person not of local origin who confesses 
Orthodox, Old Belief or Lutheran faith including Germans, Estonians, Latvians, Czechs, 
Orthodox Poles and Greeks [Ismail–Zade 2008, pp. 82–83].
But by the end of 1907 the number of the regional representatives was scaled back to 
ten with one deputy from the Russian curia and two from the Cossacks. The governorates 
of Baku, Elisabethpol and Yerivan were granted only two mandates (one for Muslims and 
one for Non-Muslims) [Ismail–Zade 2008, p. 82]. Thus, thanks to Vorontsov-Dashkov 
and Nicolas II’s consistent stand, the representativity of the Caucasus in the Third Duma 
was secured but narrowed down. In our opinion this twofold position of the Supreme 
power was determined and at the same time gave rise to anti-Georgian and anti-Arme-
nian actions by the far Right who used the Duma area to bring up the ‘Caucasian issue’. 
Furthermore the situation was relevant to Stolypin’s efforts of gathering support from the 
conservative members of the Duma and the State Council.
Finally, it was the namestnik who took it upon himself to introduce real measures to 
settle national differences in the region and to advocate for the rights of the Caucasian 
communities before the Centre. 
Between 1905 and 1906 Vorontsov-Dashkov gradually restored the dented trust in 
authorities on the part of Armenian population in terms of religious affairs.
For a long time the opposition in Armenia was not active. “In accordance with the 
policy of Russification, the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus general A. M. Dondu-
kov-Korsakov implemented the following steps: in schools the Russian language became 
prevailing and replaced the national Armenian language, Armenian Church started to 
be repressed. At the end of the 19th century revolutionary emigré communities from the 
Caucasus appeared in Western Europe and the first Caucasian political parties emerged” 
[Karnaukh 2013, p. 45]. In 1903, the head of the Caucasian administration G. S. Golitsyn 
confiscated the property of the Armenian Church. This odious act was annulled by Vo-
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rontsov-Dashkov, to the apparent considerable dissatisfaction of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. 
A secret letter from P. A. Stolypin dated December 1906 to the viceroy in the Caucasus 
sheds light on the complaints against the Armenian Church. The Department of Religious 
Affairs and non-orthodox confessions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs disapproved of 
the nationalistic policy of the Armenian Church. The clergy was accused of colluding with 
the nationalistic organization “Dashnaktsutyun”, the violation of clerical ethics (circum-
venting the Patriarch) and of the procedure of appointing members of the Synod (Etchmi-
adzin). It is clear that disapproval was implicitly addressed to the viceroy in the Caucasus, 
Count Vorontsov-Dashkov, through whose office the petition for the appointment of new 
members should have gone. The letter stated: “Obviously Patriarch-Catholicos Mkrtich 
has fallen under the influence of supporters of the Armenian revolutionary parties in his 
circle who took control of the affairs of the Patriarchate of Etchmiadzin and the Patriarch 
himself, and he cannot oppose the realization of their projects within the above-men-
tioned Church” [Perepiska s Sovetom ministrov ob armjano-tatarskih stolknovenijah…, 
l. 41].
The attempt to hold a convention of the representatives of the Armenian people in 
Etchmiadzin in 1905 caused enormous displeasure. The viceroy had already sent a report 
concerning this issue to the Ministry of the Internal Affairs in October, 1905. The po-
tential candidates for the members of the Synod (Sirakan Tigranyan and archimandrite 
Mesrop) put forward by the Patriarch were perceived as “extreme” social-democrats by 
the Ministry. “The Etchmiadzin Academy had long turned into the arena of propaganda, 
storage of weapons and illegal literature, with strangers and local agitators constantly re-
siding within this institution” [Perepiska s Sovetom ministrov ob armjano-tatarskih stol-
knovenijah…, l. 41].
Other Armenian-Gregorian dioceses came into criticism as well. In Astrakhan dio-
cese new primary classes were opened that prepared for entering a non-existent theologi-
cal seminary, later a new school for girls was opened. The Spiritual Consistory in defense 
of its actions referred to the Imperial Edict from 1 August 1905 regarding the restoration 
of the confiscated property to the Armenian Church. The logic of the civil servants from 
the capital was clear. The Church encouraged revolutionary movement, interfered in the 
prerogatives of the government and, most importantly, stimulated the development of 
national education. Blatant fault-finding with the church policy can be found in the text 
of the official letter from the Minister to the governor-general. For example, students of 
Armenian religious seminary in Nakhichevan-on-Don (now part of Rostov-on-Don) de-
manded that “one student of the 4th class, who had been expelled for making a speech in 
church during the funeral of his fellow student in which he mainly raised a question of 
the harm of living in a boarding school to seminarians, be admitted again” [Perepiska s 
Sovetom ministrov ob armjano-tatarskih stolknovenijah…, l. 42]. If such incidents drew 
the attention of the minister, it’s no wonder that Vorontsov-Dashkov had a negative per-
ception Stolypin’s policy towards the Caucasus. 
“The circumstances described above clearly show Patriarch-Catholicos Mkrtich’s un-
suitability for a high position of the head of the Armenian-Gregorian Church at present 
and his inability to govern it in accordance with the law”. It was also mentioned in the 
letter that “taking any exceptional measures with regard to the Catholicos is currently 
extremely undesirable” [Perepiska s Sovetom ministrov ob armjano-tatarskih stolkno-
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venijah, l. 42]. However, P. A. Stolypin believed that the government had to demonstrate 
firmness. “In the first place it’s necessary to recommend Patriarch-Catholicos Mkrtich, on 
account of his sick condition and old age, to retire, allowing him to reside in Etchmiadzin 
monastery, and to provide him with an adequate pension but on condition of his total 
exclusion from any affairs”
Ad interim the Church was supposed to be headed by the Synod., P. A. Stolypin sug-
gested introducing a new regulation concerning the Armenian-Gregorian church. This 
had to be modelled “in accordance with regulations on governing other Churches without 
giving the exceptional independence which it now enjoys against the interest of the state” 
[Perepiska s Sovetom ministrov ob armjano-tatarskih stolknovenijah…, l. 43]. The clergy 
disloyal to the authorities were to be removed from the Patriarch’s circle. The Minister 
urged the governor-general to notify him of any changes which had occurred in the com-
position of the Synod over the last two years.
The reply was sent a month later: 29  January 1907. Vorontsov-Dashkov wrote: “It 
is unlikely to expect the Patriarch to retire himself, and I do not know whether such is 
permissible according to the canons of the Armenian-Gregorian Church”. The fact that 
Etchmiadzin Synod governed ecclesiastical matters contradicted Russian legislation. “The 
Patriarch has the full cooperation of the Etchmiadzin Synod; however, never will the Patri-
arch give up the prerogatives of his rank, neither to the Synod, or to any other institution, 
nor to a representative of the state” [Perepiska s Sovetom ministrov ob armjano-tatarskih 
stolknovenijah…, ll. 44–44 ob.]
The namestnik considered it impossible to put pressure on the head of the Armenian 
Church. The Catholicos was 90 years old. He had been Patriarch since 1893 and enjoyed 
an immense popularity among Armenians. He embodied the religious and national unity 
for the worshippers. “If confiscating church and school properties some time ago revolu-
tionized the Armenian people, who had not been interested in politics before, and who 
are only now returning to their prior normal state, it is unrealistic not to envisage a surge 
of public outcry in the case of exerting any coercion on the head of the Armenian church”, 
wrote viceroy Vorontsov-Dashkov. He did not want to stir up he moderate sections of 
Armenian society. He stated: “Not denying the existence in Etchmiadzin of some persons 
belonging to the revolutionary party who influence the elderly Patriarch, I can’t but admit 
a certain extent of loyalty in Catholicos Mkrtich himself ” [Perepiska s Sovetom ministrov 
ob armjano-tatarskih stolknovenijah…, ll. 44 ob. — 45]. 
The patriarch thanked the governor-general who brought the all-Armenian conven-
tion in Etchmiadzin to an end. In his kontakion, the Patriarch suspended the creation of 
a new Armenian settlement with the assistance of foreign subjects of Armenian origin. 
The governor-general might have been critical of the reform of the Armenian-Gregorian 
church. He asked Stolypin to give proposals concerning these matters, which had been 
handed over to Saint Petersburg by the former commander of civil administration in the 
Caucasus in December 1903, back to the local administration for further debate.
The namestnik’s views on the issue of emancipation of Muslim population in the Cau-
casus were no less “liberal”. In 1906 a meeting of the Muslim representatives of Kuban and 
Terek districts was held where a document about establishing an independent community 
administration of Muslims in Northern Caucasus was drawn up. Th relatively loyal be-
haviour of Muslim officials and fears of a rise of Islamism forced the government to make 
concessions to the local élite. In 1913 an institute of conciliators appointed by a military 
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governor from among Russian civil servants and local landlords was initiated in Dagestan. 
[Khlynina, Urushadze 2011, p. 97].
The orthodox clergy in Georgia, as well as the nobility, by and large preferred to 
cooperate with authorities, submitting petitions and proposals to change the situation. 
For example, a general request of representatives of the Georgian clergy for restoration of 
autocephaly seemed to be quite moderate, though one of the petitions contained threats to 
make a Church union with the Pope in default [Volhonskij etc. 2013, p. 156]. Nikolas the 
Exarch of Georgia wrote with regards to the petition of all bishops, except for the bishop 
of Sukhumi, about “the monarch’s granting autocephaly to the Church of Georgia”: “I 
humbly petition to come to Saint Petersburg and report this crucial matter personally” [O 
snoshenijah s raznymi mestami i licami, l. 5]. It is doubtful that the authorities would have 
agreed to implement the reform given the absence of the independence of the Russian 
Orthodox Church. There was no reply to the letter…
On the whole, we fully agree with the statement that the “viceroyalty became a re-
gional embodiment of strong centralized power having large prerogatives but at the same 
time…being close to the governed territories and, therefore, more pragmatic and flexible” 
[Agasbekova 2011, p. 11]. After the convocation of the first State Duma, deputes directed 
a barrage of criticism at the Council of Ministers. From 15 June to 23 June 1906  there 
followed inquiries from the Duma, unpleasant to the authorities, about the trial by court 
martial in Tiflis of 27 soldiers from the Mingrel regiment; about sending a punitive expe-
dition to Svanetia; about an anticipated pogrom in Batumi; about unlawful arrest without 
charge [Perepiska s Sovetom ministrov ob armjano-tatarskih stolknovenijah…, l. 29]. 
Inquiries were initiated by deputes on the basis of information sent from the local ar-
eas, and addressed to both I. L. Goremykin and specialized ministers, namely the Minister 
of War and Minister of Justice. As far as inquiries about dispatching troops to Svanetia and 
a threat of pogroms in Batumi were concerned, the Duma received no response from the 
government. 
New principles of the regional policy were developed by the Committee of Ministers 
on the basis of the decree from December 12, 1904. Under the pressure of the revolu-
tion Nicolas II agreed to administrative de-centralization. We can suggest several reasons 
for his decision: his personal trust in Vorontsov-Dashkov, weakening positions in central 
structures and uncoordinated actions of ministers in the fight against revolution in the 
Caucasus.
The program of “pacification” of the Caucasus through the liberal administrative and 
political reforms associated with the name of Vorontsov-Dashkov proved to be successful 
in the long run. However, his hyper-independent policy resulted in multiple conflicts with 
civil servants in Saint Petersburg and the State Duma. These struggles hindered the im-
plementation of the changes during the first Russian revolution. A personal factor is also 
worth taking into account: Vorontsov-Dashkov had awkward dealings with some mem-
bers of the government, especially with P. A. Stolypin who came to the fore after 1906. In 
our opinion, local élites of the region (first of all, of Transcaucasia) contributed much to 
the incomplete character of the reforms. Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani political 
representatives, having quite wide-scale and radical programs of reforms (due to the stan-
dards of the passive authorities of the Empire) tried to gain maximum capitulations from 
the government in the shortest possible time, demonstrating explicit and implicit support 
of revolutionary circles (Georgian social-democrats demonstrated the most aggressive be-
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havior). At the same time the imperial administration’s overriding demand for the resto-
ration of minimally safe conditions was more or less ignored by the public. Thus, political 
activists, who had later become Caucasian deputes of the State Duma, fell between two 
camps. Revolutionaries were ready to support them as long as their voluntary defenders 
blocked the security actions of central authorities. The imperial authorities, in their turn, 
were willing to cooperate upon condition their prerogatives were not questioned. Having 
chosen the language of slogans and massive pressure on Tsarist administration, the del-
egates eliminated the possibility of satisfying their voters’ expectations. At the same time 
they deliberately played the roles of background actors in settling regional conflicts with-
out overcoming a set of local identities and positivistic approach.
In conclusion, the viceroyalty was the most effective institution against the back-
ground of the First Russian revolution though it remained an interim and emergency 
structure. Only H. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov had enough prerogatives and the subtle under-
standing of the situation. However, the limitations embedded within its essence eliminat-
ed the possibility of the drastic resolution of the problems, many of which still torment 
the Caucasus.
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